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I
n 2002, Walter and Weinberg examined the federal ﬁnancial safety net
as it stood at the end of 1999 (Walter and Weinberg 2002). At the time,
the authors estimated that approximately 45 percent of all ﬁnancial ﬁrm
liabilitieswereprotectedbythesafetynet. Asonewouldexpectinthisarticle,
thecurrentestimateindicatesthatthesizeofthenethasgrown,astheﬁnancial
market turmoil that began in 2007 led federal government agencies to expand
the range of institutions and the types of liabilities protected by the safety net.
1. THE SAFETY NET: ITS DEFINITION, COSTS,
AND BENEFITS
Walter and Weinberg deﬁned the federal ﬁnancial safety net as consisting of
all explicit or implicit government guarantees of private ﬁnancial liabilities.
Private ﬁnancial liabilities are those owed by one private market participant to
another. As used by Walter and Weinberg, the phrase government guarantee
meansafederalgovernmentcommitmenttoprotectlendersfromlossesdueto
a borrower’s default (Walter and Weinberg 2002).1 Following this deﬁnition,
we include in our estimate of the safety net, insured bank and thrift deposits,
certain other banking company liabilities, some government-sponsored enter-
prise (GSE) liabilities, selected private employer pension liabilities, as well as
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1 In addition to estimating the proportion of ﬁnancial ﬁrm liabilities backed by the federal
government, Walter and Weinberg also estimated the proportion of nonﬁnancial ﬁrm and household
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a subset of the liabilities of other ﬁnancial ﬁrms. The details of why we chose
to include these liabilities are provided below.
Effect of a Safety Net on Economic Efﬁciency
Government actions in the form of subsidies, taxes, or regulations change
market outcomes, and in competitive markets such changes distort allocations
and can reduce economic efﬁciency. Does the ﬁnancial safety net cause dis-
tortions? As discussed in Walter and Weinberg, in principle, the government
could design guarantees that mimic market outcomes. Typically, however,
government intervention arises from a desire to alter market outcomes. In
the case of guarantees, this means either expanding coverage or underpricing
relative to private market guarantees. Underpricing means that the guaran-
tor collects fees that are less than the expected value of its obligations. This
underpricing subsidizes risk taking.
Underpriced guarantees tend to shift resources away from activities that
are not covered toward those that are. In that way, a government guarantee
is similar to a direct subsidy paid to those engaged in a particular activity. A
guarantee is different, however, in the way it affects attitudes toward risk. By
assigningtothegovernmentpartoftheriskintheactivitiesbeingﬁnanced,the
safety net reduces market participants’ willingness to control risk. Overpro-
vision of guarantees, while not necessarily drawing resources into an activity,
does shift risk preferences in a way similar to underpricing. In short, guaran-
tees lead to expanded risk taking.
Our calculation of the size of the safety net does not represent a measure
of the size of the distortions to the allocation of resources and risk taking.




to the size of the safety net. Other things being equal, the greater the share of
private liabilities protected by the government safety net, the more likely it is
that government guarantees are extending beyond the level of protection that
would be provided in a private market.
Why Have a Safety Net?
If the safety net is distortionary, why have one? Proponents of the ﬁnancial
safety net, especially as it applies to banks, often argue that private risk-
sharing arrangements tend to disregard the systemic consequences of large
losses borne by an individual or a small group of institutions. The idea here is
that such losses might spill over and generate further losses caused, for exam-
ple, by a contagious loss of investor conﬁdence. Under such a view, govern-N. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 275
ment protection for certain investors could prevent widespread ﬁnancial panic
or distress. While the potential systemic consequences of a large ﬁnancial
failure are difﬁcult to assess, when faced with the possibility of widespread
failures of ﬁnancial ﬁrms, policymakers are likely to conclude that preventing
such failures by protecting creditors of ﬁnancial ﬁrms (providing safety net
protection) is prudent.
Similarly, some observers maintain that the safety net protections can
lower the costs of, and therefore encourage, certain highly beneﬁcial ﬁnancial
arrangements. For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argue that banks’
performanceofthematuritytransformationfunctionishighlybeneﬁcialtothe
economy but is more costly without government-provided deposit insurance.
Banks perform maturity transformation by gathering money from numerous
short-termdepositors(thosebankcustomerswhosedepositsmaturesoonafter
deposited—especially checking deposits, which are available, meaning that
they mature, immediately after being deposited) to fund long-term loans to
businesses and individuals. Without deposit insurance, which only the gov-
ernment has sufﬁcient resources to provide, bank runs are likely to occur.
A bank run happens when many depositors attempt to withdraw their funds
simultaneously. Since banks make long-term loans, they cannot recover suf-
ﬁcient money from borrowers to meet a run and, therefore, fail. To protect
themselves from runs, banks can undertake costly private measures, but Dia-
mond and Dybvig argue that government deposit insurance is likely to be less
expensive and therefore preferable to such measures.
2. LEGISLATIVEAND REGULATORY CHANGES THAT
EXPANDED THE SAFETY NET
As shown in Table 1, we estimated the proportion of ﬁnancial ﬁrm liabilities
protected as of the end of 2009. By the end of 2009, a number of govern-
ment programs had been established to address turmoil in ﬁnancial markets.
Employing methods similar to those used by Walter and Weinberg when they
measured the size of the safety net for the end of 1999, we ﬁnd that as of the
end of 2009 about 59 percent of ﬁnancial ﬁrm liabilities were protected by the
federal safety net.
One of the most important reasons for the increase from 1999 to 2009
is the enlarged portion of banking ﬁrm liabilities that market participants are
likely to consider protected: banking and savings ﬁrm liabilities with an im-
plicit backing. In 1999, implicitly guaranteed liabilities of banks and savings
institutions amounted to about 13 percent of all of these ﬁrms’liabilities (15.9
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billion; in 2009, about 45 percent of banking and savings ﬁrm liabilities were
implicitly guaranteed, by our estimate, amounting to $7.3 billion.2
How did Walter and Weinberg determine which institutions to include as
having an implicit guarantee and which liabilities issued by these institutions
might be covered? As the authors noted, the critical question is whether
market participants believe that a given institution will be protected, even
though ofﬁcial policy may not state explicitly that all of these liabilities are




all had assets (in 1999 dollars) of more than $50 billion, which was greater
than the smallest of the 11 institutions identiﬁed by the Comptroller of the
Currency in 1984 as potentially too big to fail (Walter and Weinberg 2002,
p. 381). The liabilities that Walter and Weinberg assumed the market would
be highly likely to view as protected were deposits of more than $100,000
(deposits of less than $100,000 are included in the “Explicitly Guaranteed
Liabilities” column in the tables), federal funds loans made to the 21 banks
and two thrifts, and repo transactions with these banks and thrifts. Though
we intend to use a similar methodology for estimating the size of implicit
guarantees for banking companies in 2009, events during the recent ﬁnancial
crisis required some adjustments.
Support for Stress-Tested Financial Companies
Giventhatthegovernmenthadrespondedaggressivelytoproblemsinﬁnancial
ﬁrms during the ﬁnancial turmoil of 2008–2009, our challenge is to decide
which institutions have implicit guarantees. Here we maintain that market
participantswereverylikelytoassumethattheliabilitiesoftheﬁnancialﬁrms
that were stress tested early in 2009 (participants in the Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program—SCAP) had a strong likelihood of receiving federal
backing if they suffered ﬁnancial distress. Indeed, the announcement of the
stress tests in February 2009 came with a promise of government-provided
capitalforstress-testedinstitutionsthatwereshowntobeinneedofadditional
capital:
Under [the Treasury’s Capital Assistance Program] CAP, federal banking
supervisors will conduct forward-looking assessments [SCAP stress tests]
to evaluate the capital needs of the major U.S. banking institutions un-
der a more challenging economic environment. Should that assessment
indicate that an additional capital buffer is warranted, banks will have
2An explanation of the factors underlying the large increase is provided below.278 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
an opportunity to turn ﬁrst to private sources of capital. In light of the
current challenging market environment, the Treasury is making govern-
ment capital available immediately through the CAP to eligible banking
institutions to provide this buffer. (FinancialStability.gov 2009)
Additionally, a number of these ﬁrms did, in fact, receive government aid
in the form of capital injections in 2008 and early 2009 through theTreasury’s
Capital Purchase Program or in response to the stress tests (FinancialStabil-
ity.gov 2010, pp. 21, 27, 67–80). This aid, both the aid promised under the
CAPandaidreceivedthroughtheCapitalPurchaseProgram,reducedthelike-
lihood that all liabilityholders of the protected ﬁrms would suffer losses, so
here we include all liabilities of the stress-tested banking institutions in our
safety net calculation.
While some observers in 2009 may have viewed the likely passage of
ﬁnancial reform legislation as diminishing federal backing, we nevertheless
count the liabilities of the stress-tested ﬁrms. Legislation that was intended
to limit the chance that ﬁnancial institutions would receive federal aid was
being considered in the U.S. Congress during 2009. If market participants
were convinced that such legislation would forestall any opportunity for the
creditors of the largest ﬁnancial institutions to be protected by the federal
government, then our calculation might appropriately exclude the liabilities
of stress-tested banking institutions. In fact, most of the legislative proposals
included language that called for the closure of troubled ﬁnancial ﬁrms with
losses to equityholders and at least some creditors (though at least one leading
proposal contained protections for creditors of ﬁnancial ﬁrms if the failure of
such a ﬁrm might create a systemic risk).3 Nevertheless, legislative proposals
contained provisions meant to establish a mechanism that could clearly iden-
tify “systemically important” ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Such mechanisms seem likely
to encourage market participant expectations of federal aid to the creditors of
the largest (i.e., systemically important) ﬁrms. Given the ambiguous effect of
the reform proposals on the probability of federal aid to the largest banking
ﬁrms, and the clear protections provided for troubled ﬁrms and for their cred-
itors during the ﬁnancial turmoil, we retain their liabilities in our estimate of
liabilities protected by the safety net, in keeping with Walter and Weinberg
(2002). (Inalatersectionweremovetheliabilitiesofstress-testedinstitutions
and re-estimate the size of the safety net—see Table 2.)
Asindicatedearlier,thetotalliabilitiesofthe19stress-testedbankholding
companies, less their liabilities that were explicitly covered by deposit insur-
ance, summed to $7.3 trillion (“Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities” column in
3 See H.R. 4173 as of December 2, 2009, p. 370, available at: http://www.house.gov/apps/
list/press/ﬁnancialsvcs dem/presscfpa 121109.shtml.N. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 279
the tables). This sum equals about 45 percent of all banking and savings ﬁrm
liabilities.
Increased Ceiling on Insured Deposits
Several Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) programs expanded
the explicit portion of the safety net for banks and thrifts (“Explicitly Guar-
anteed Liabilities” column in the tables) beyond the long-standing $100,000
coverage for deposits (which are also included in the “Explicitly Guaranteed
Liabilities” column in the tables).4 For example, in October 2008 the Emer-
gencyEconomicStabilizationActof2008temporarilyincreasedFDICdeposit
insurance coverage from $100,000 to $250,000, until December 31, 2009. In
May 2009, the $250,000 cap was extended to December 31, 2010, by the
Helping Families Save Their HomesAct. In July 2010, legislation made per-
manent the $250,000 coverage limit (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2010a).
TransactionAccount Guarantee Program
Further, in October 2008 the FDIC implemented a program to insure unin-
sured deposits (those deposits in accounts containing more than $250,000) in
noninterest-bearing transactions accounts for those insured banks and thrifts
wishing to participate. The program is temporary. At ﬁrst it covered such
transactions accounts until December 31, 2009. Later the FDIC extended
the program’s coverage until June 30, 2010, and then extended it again until
December 31, 2010, with a pre-announced option to extend it an additional
12 months (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2010a).5 This program,
the Transaction Account Guarantee Program (TAGP), added $834 billion to
our “Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities” column in the tables for banking and
savings ﬁrms (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2009c).
Debt Guarantee Program
Last, in October 2008 the FDIC offered, to banking and savings institutions
wishingtoparticipate,theoptiontoreceiveFDICinsurancecoverageforsenior
unsecured debt issued by such institutions. This Debt Guarantee Program
4 Since April 2006, deposits in certain retirement accounts at banks and thrifts have been
protected by the FDIC up to $250,000 (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 2006). Deposits in
such accounts, up to the $250,000 ceiling, are included in the “Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities”
column of our tables.
5 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act extended coverage for
noninterest-bearing transaction accounts through December 31, 2012 (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation 2010c).280 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
(DGP) at ﬁrst covered debt issued by June 30, 2009, and maturing by June 30,
2010. The DGP was later extended to cover debt issued by October 31, 2009,
and maturing by December 31, 2012. As of December 31, 2009, the program
was insuring $309 billion in debt (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
2009b).
3. OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE SAFETY NET
As in 1999, we include for 2009 the liabilities of government-sponsored en-
terprises (direct GSE liabilities plus the dollar amount of mortgage-backed
security guarantees) in the “Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities” column in the
tables. Earlier we noted that government guarantees can often modify market
prices. Though our article has made no attempt to measure the size of guar-
antees’ effect on market prices, in the case of the GSEs’ implicit guarantee,
the size of the effect on market prices has been estimated by Passmore (2005)
and others.6 Passmore (2005) estimates that the average homeowner saved
between 3 and 11 basis points on his or her mortgage because of the implicit
guarantee. The subsidy lowers the GSEs’ borrowing costs, and some of this
saved borrowing cost is passed on to homeowners by the GSE in the form of
lowered mortgage interest rates. Passmore calculates that about half of the
guarantee’s beneﬁt ﬂows to the shareholders of the GSEs. While theTreasury
made clear its support for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac once these two ﬁ-
nancial ﬁrms were placed in conservatorship in September 2008, the support
was not as strongly stated as that given to insured deposits, so we leave these
liabilities in the implicit column in the tables.7
We estimate the amount of private pensions explicitly guaranteed in 2009
by the Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) based on the latest
privatepensiondataavailable, whicharedatafor2007(PensionBeneﬁtGuar-
antee Corporation 2010, pp. 83, 105). Our admittedly rough 2009 ﬁgure is
derivedbysimplyadjustingthe2007ﬁgurebytwicetheaverageannualgrowth
rate of private pension liabilities for the previous 10 years (1997–2007).
We also count all of the liabilities ofAmerican International Group (AIG)
as implicitly guaranteed in the “Other Financial Firms” row in the tables.8
6 Beyond Passmore, the Congressional Budget Ofﬁce (2001) also developed estimates of the
GSEs’ guarantee on mortgage interest rates.
7 We treat Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as private entities and therefore include their liabil-
ities in our table, consistent with the way Walter and Weinberg treated these entities, even though
the status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac as privately owned ﬁrms is more ambiguous now than
in 1999.
8 The insured deposit liabilities of AIG’s savings bank are not included in the “Other Financial
Firms” row since these liabilities were included in the “Banking and Savings Firms” row. While
AIG owns a savings bank, it is not classiﬁed as a bank holding company (and does not ﬁle a bank
holding company report [Y9C] with federal regulators), so we do not include it in the Banking
and Savings Firms row.N. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 281
We count their liabilities as such because of the aid provided them by the
Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury followingAIG’s ﬁnancial problems in
September2008. Becausetherewerenoclearsignalsaboutwhetheraidmight
be forthcoming for other large, nonbank ﬁnancial ﬁrms (beyond the stress test
ﬁrms), we did not include the liabilities of any ﬁrms other than AIG in the
“Other Financial Firms” row in tables.
4. ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE OF THE
SAFETY NET
As has been noted, Table 1 is based on several assumptions similar to those
made by Walter and Weinberg in 2002. For example, we assumed that all
liabilities of stress-tested bank holding companies would be protected, not
just the liabilities representing FDIC-insured bank deposits. What would be
the size of the safety net if these assumptions were changed?
Contrary to our assumption about the likely protection of liabilityholders
of stress-tested companies, one can imagine circumstances under which such
liabilityholders might be left unprotected. If one of these companies were to
failatatimewhenﬁnancialmarketswerebroadlyhealthy,policymakerscould
more easily allow the company to be handled as a bankruptcy so that no gov-
ernment funds are employed to protect liabilityholders (of course, the holders
of FDIC-insured deposits would still be covered given that such deposits are
protected regardless of the circumstances surrounding the failure). In times
of general ﬁnancial market strength, the failure of a large holding company
could perhaps be absorbed without worries of a cascade of additional failures.
And at such times, if the ﬁrm were handled through the Dodd-FrankAct’s or-
derly liquidation process, it is possible that neither the government nor other
ﬁnancial ﬁrms would provide funds to protect liabilityholders.9
While investors might expect large ﬁnancial ﬁrm failures to typically oc-
cur in times of widespread ﬁnancial weakness, and therefore anticipate that
their investments would be protected, some large ﬁrms have failed in times of
ﬁnancial market health. One such example was London-based Barings Bank,
which failed when ﬁnancial markets were broadly strong in 1995. Its failure
was because of the huge trading losses generated by one unchecked Barings
traderwhotooklarge, unauthorizedfuturespositions. Giventhattherearecir-
cumstancesunderwhichtheholdersofstress-testedcompanyliabilitiesmight
be left unprotected, dropping the assumption of their coverage and recalculat-
ing our estimate of implicitly guaranteed liabilities seems worthwhile.
9 The Orderly Liquidation Authority section of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010 contains provisions that allow funds gathered from assessments on
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Large ﬁnancial ﬁrms that are not bank holding companies might receive no
protection in such instances, so we also drop liabilities of AIG from those
liabilities with implicit backing.
Also,weincludedinourexplicitlyinsureddepositscategorythosedeposits
covered by the FDIC’s temporary guarantee programs, since these programs
were in place in 2009. But under the debt guarantee program no new debt
issues were covered after October 31, 2009 (Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration 2010b). The TAGP was set to expire as of the end of 2010, though
the Dodd-Frank Act extended it to December 31, 2012. In the case of future
ﬁnancial ﬁrm failures, such programs may not be in place, and might not be
reinstated. Therefore, re-estimating our measure of the size of the safety net
without considering these deposits as protected also seems worthwhile.
Table2containsourestimateofthesizeofthesafetynetwithoutincluding
the liabilities of the stress-tested bank holding companies,AIG, and the FDIC
temporaryinsuranceprogramdeposits. Thesechangesmeanthat,comparedto
Table 1, the proportion of liabilities receiving explicit and implicit guarantees
falls to 37.2 percent.
Additionally, while we assume that the liabilityholders of the housing and
farm credit GSEs will be protected from loss, as were such holders of Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac debt during the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis, under some
circumstances such holders might be left unprotected. As in the case of the
stress-tested companies, if a GSE were to fail during a period in which ﬁnan-
cial markets were healthy, policymakers might leave debtholders unprotected.
Therefore, it is possible that one might want to exclude the liabilities of the
GSEs from the calculation of the safety net. If the $6.8 trillion in liabilities of
the GSEs were removed (which are the only implicitly guaranteed liabilities
in Table 2), then our measure of the safety net would shrink to 21 percent of
total liabilities in Table 2, the amount of explicit liabilities shown in Table 2.
Somereadersmightcontendthatonecategoryofliabilities,whichwehave
excluded from our safety net estimate, could legitimately be added: money
market mutual fund liabilities. In the creation of our tables, and in Walter
and Weinberg (2002), mutual fund liabilities are excluded because the prin-
cipal value of mutual fund investments, including money market mutual fund
investments, can decline, without the mutual fund defaulting, if the entity in
which the funds are invested defaults. As a result, these investments are akin
to equity and unlike private liabilities—the focus of our estimates—which
typically must pay back full principal (or else be in default). For example, an
investor in a money market mutual fund, which in turn invested in ﬁnancial
ﬁrm commercial paper, could lose principal if the commercial paper was not
repaid, but the mutual fund can continue to operate (i.e., not default).10 This
10 Money market mutual funds are loath to pay back less than full principal (“break the
buck” in mutual fund parlance), and few have done so over time. Instead, the money market284 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
view of money market mutual fund investments as equity must be tempered,
however, by events in 2008. Speciﬁcally, the Treasury stepped in and pro-
tected investors in mutual funds from losses, thereby treating investments in
the funds like other guaranteed liabilities, in which losses are prevented by
government assistance or guarantees. As a result, one might argue that our
estimates of the fraction of total liabilities carrying a government guarantee—
both the numerator and denominator—should include money market mutual
funds. If one adds the amount of such fund balances outstanding at the end of
2009 ($3.3 trillion [Investment Company Institute 2010]) to our estimates in
the column “Explicitly and Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities” in Table 1, the
proportion would increase to 62 percent. The Table 2 ﬁgure would increase
to 42 percent.
5. CONCLUSION
Recent government actions by legislators and ﬁnancial regulators expanded
the federal ﬁnancial safety net. Such actions include augmentation of deposit
insurance, debt guarantees for banking companies, aid to stress-tested ﬁnan-
cial ﬁrms, and, perhaps, various regulatory reform legislative proposals. As
discussed in Walter and Weinberg (2002), this expansion has likely encour-
aged a view that liabilityholders will be protected by the federal government
in times of ﬁnancial difﬁculty in the future. As a result of this expectation of
governmentprotection,liabilityholderswillexerciselessoversightoverﬁnan-
cial ﬁrm risk taking then they would without this expectation, ﬁnancial ﬁrms
will undertake more risk, and ﬁnancial market decisions will be distorted and
inefﬁcient.
mutual fund’s parent typically injects funds to allow the fund to pay back full principal. This
behavior by mutual fund parent companies indicates that parent companies and investors may well
view money market mutual fund investments more as liabilities than equity, regardless of the fact
that money market mutual funds can break the buck without defaulting.N. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 285
APPENDIX A: LEGEND TO TABLE 1
• Banking and Savings Firms11
– Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities
∗ FDIC-insureddepositsofallcommercialbanksandsavingsin-
stitutionsincludingtransactionaccountscoveredbytheFDIC’s
TAGP, plus debt guaranteed by the FDIC’s DGP
– Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities
∗ Total liabilities of the 19 stress-tested institutions, less FDIC-
insured deposits and accounts covered by TAGP and debt cov-
ered by DGP for the 19 stress-tested institutions
• Credit Unions
– Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities
∗ National Credit Union Administration-insured shares and
deposits
• Government Sponsored Enterprises
– Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities of:
∗ Fannie Mae
· Total liabilities





· Freddie Mac participation certiﬁcates and structured
securities held by third parties
∗ Farm Credit System
· Total liabilities
· Farmer Mac guarantees
∗ Federal Home Loan Banks
· Total liabilities
11 See Section 4 for a description of the differences between Table 1 and Table 2 estimates.286 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
• Private Employer Pension Funds
– Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities
∗ Pension liabilities backed by the PBGC
• Other Financial Firms
– Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities
∗ Total liabilities of AIG, less FDIC-insured deposits of AIG
Federal Savings Bank
APPENDIX B: DATA APPENDIX TO TABLE 1
Banking and Savings Firms—Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
“Estimated FDIC-insured deposits” of commercial banks, savings
institutions, and U.S. branches of foreign banks (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation 2009a), plus “Amount Guaranteed” in the
Transaction Account Guarantee Program (Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation 2009c), plus “Debt Outstanding” in the Debt
GuaranteeProgram(FederalDepositInsuranceCorporation2009b).
Banking and Savings Firms—Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
Totalliabilitiesofthe19stress-testedinstitutionsfoundintheY9C(quar-
terlybankholdingcompanyﬁnancialreports),less1)theexplicitly
guaranteed deposits of the banks and savings institutions owned
by these 19 ﬁrms, and 2) the FDIC-insured debt (insured under the
DGP) of each of these institutions. The estimated FDIC-insured
deposits and the guaranteed amount in noninterest-bearing trans-
action accounts for each bank can be found on the FDIC’s website
in the “Institution Directory” (www2.fdic.gov/idasp). The amount
of DGP debt of each ﬁrm can be found on the ﬁrms’10Ks.
Banking and Savings Firms—Total Liabilities:
Total liabilities from the following sources: For large (consolidated as-
sets of over $500 million) bank holding companies, Consolidated
Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (FRY9C); for
small (consolidated assets less than $500 million) bank holdingN. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 287
companies, Parent Company Only Financial Statements for Small
Bank Holding Companies (FR Y9SP)—from which consolidated
totalliabilitiescanbederived; forbanksnotownedbyabankhold-
ing company, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for
a Bank (FFIEC 031 and FFIEC 041); and for all thrift liabilities,
Thrift Financial Reports.
Credit Unions—Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
Total insured shares at the $250,000 limit (National Credit Union
Administration 2009).
Credit Unions—Total Liabilities:




Total liabilities, plus Fannie Mae MBS held by third parties, plus
other guarantees found in the Fannie Mae 10K, “Item 6.
Selected Financial Data” (p. 70).
Freddie Mac:
10K report of Freddie Mac, “Total liabilities” (“Consolidated Bal-
ance Sheets,” p. 209), plus “Total PCs and Structured Se-
curities issued” (“Item 6. Selected Financial Data,” p. 57),
less “Total Freddie Mac PCs and Structured Securities held”
in Freddie Mac portfolio (Table 28, p. 104).
Farm Credit System:
FarmCreditSystem(2010),“Totalliabilities”(“CombinedStatement
of Condition Data,” p. 3), plus “Farmer Mac guarantees” (p.
12).
Federal Home Loan Banks:
Federal Home Loan Banks (2010), “Total liabilities” (“Combined
Statement of Condition,” p. 194).
Private Employer Pension Funds—Explicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
Liabilities of all pension funds insured by the PBGC (which insures only
deﬁnedbeneﬁtplans)were$2,559billionin2007,thelatestdatefor
which data are reported (Pension Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation288 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
2010, pp. 83, 105). This ﬁgure is inﬂated by twice (because 2007–
2009 involves two years of growth) the average annual growth rate
of PBGC-insured pension liabilities from 1997–2007 to obtain our
estimate of all liabilities in pension funds insured by the PBGC as
of December 31, 2009 ($2,946 billion). Since PBGC covers pen-
sions only up to a speciﬁed maximum payment per year, a portion
of beneﬁciaries’ pensions in guaranteed plans—those with pen-
sions paying above this maximum—are not insured. According
to the PBGC, this portion is estimated to be 4–5 percent (Pension
Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation 2007, p. 24; Pension Beneﬁt Guar-
antee Corporation 1997, footnote to Table B-5). To arrive at the
guaranteed portion of PBGC guaranteed pension fund liabilities,
we multiplied total 2009 fund liabilities ($2,946 billion) by 0.95 to
yield $2,799 billion.
Private Employer Pension Funds—Total Liabilities:
There appears to be no data on the total liabilities of all private employer-
deﬁned beneﬁt pension funds. Therefore, we estimate our total
liabilityﬁgurebasedonPBGCdata. Toderiveourﬁgure, webegin
withourpreviouslydeterminedestimateofallprivatepensionfund
liabilities that are included in PBGC ($2,946) and then divide it by
0.9toarriveatourtotalliabilityﬁgureof$3,273billion. ThePBGC
insures only about two-thirds of private sector single-employer-
deﬁnedbeneﬁtplans, butalmostallmulti-employerplans(Pension
Beneﬁt Guarantee Corporation 2009, p. 5). Among the types




multi-employer plans, we assume that it covers well more than 66
percent (i.e., two-thirds) of all liabilities, setting our estimate at 90
percent.
Other Financial Firms—Implicitly Guaranteed Liabilities:
“Total liabilities ofAIG” found in its 10K report, less “estimated insured
deposits” ofAIG Federal Savings Bank found on the FDIC’s web-
site in the “Institution Directory” (http://www2.fdic.gov/idasp).
Other Financial Firms—Total Liabilities:
Board of Governors (2010),Tables L.116—Property-Casualty Insurance
Companies; L.117—Life Insurance Companies; L.126—IssuersN. Malysheva and J. R. Walter: The Federal Financial Safety Net 289
ofAsset-Backed Securities; L.127—Finance Companies; L.128—
RealEstateInvestmentTrusts; L.129—SecurityBrokersandDeal-
ers; L.131—Funding Corporations, less taxes payable whenever a
ﬁgure for taxes was reported on these tables.
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